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Interest rates have been at historical lows for some time now. There are many possible reasons why that is so. We make use of recent work done at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland that allows us to look at individual components of interest rates and see which are exerting the biggest infl uence. Knowing why rates are where they are now helps to predict where interest rates will likely be in the near future. ISSN 0428-1276 Why Are Interest Rates So Low? Joseph G. Haubrich As anyone following the fi nancial news, refi nancing a mortgage, or even checking their savings account knows, interest rates remain at historically low levels. But interest rates can be, and have been, much higher. Rates on the three-month Treasury bill hit nearly 15 percent in early 1982, when Olivia Newton John topped the charts with "Physical" and Ozzie Osbourne gained notoriety for biting the head off a bat. Now, while you were uploading your video of the "Harlem Shake," and Kelly is the Osbourne most in the public eye, rates are down below one-tenth of one percent, a rate that, prior to the crisis, hadn't been seen since Glenn Miller topped the charts with "Chattanooga Choo Choo."
What is keeping interest rates so low? The question can be answered on many levels, and though some people are quick to assign credit (or blame) to the Federal Reserve, China, or the current administration, more practical answers follow from eschewing the politics and looking at the question from an investment standpoint.
In this Economic Commentary we take that approach, making use of recent work done here at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, which breaks interest rates apart into the various factors that determine what those rates will be. Looking at these components allows us to see which are exerting the biggest effects and helps to predict where interest rates will likely be in the near future.
Breaking Up Is Hard to Do
A variety of components contribute to the level of interest rates, and looking at each one separately will give us a good idea of the factors behind low rates.
One of the largest contributors to the level of interest rates is credit risk. This refl ects the difference between risky and riskless debt-between debt that might not be paid back and debt that almost certainly will be repaid. Lenders demand a higher interest rate for taking on credit risk, something the fi nancial trade calls a risk premium. Many of the interest rates consumers normally deal with have this sort of riskrates on credit cards, mortgages, and auto loans. We won't talk much about credit risk in this Commentary, because nailing down riskless debt will tell us a lot about what is driving interest rates.
Since the credit risk premium is on top of the interest rate charged for riskless debt, the fi rst step is to understand what moves that riskless rate around. We will concentrate on U.S. Treasury securities, taking them as riskless, which still seems a safe assumption, though perhaps not as blatantly obvious as in the days before the fi scal cliff and the downgrade by Standard & Poor's.
tion. In other words, the interest rate on the nominal bond is the real rate, plus the expected infl ation rate, plus a risk premium for unexpected infl ation.
This risk premium has several consequences for measuring expected infl ation. First, the TIPS breakeven measure is not quite right. In general, it overstates infl ation expectations because it includes the risk premium. Furthermore, it is unclear what it means if the breakeven infl ation rate increases. Is it because people confi dently expect higher infl ation, or because they are more worried about how variable prices will be? Another problem with the breakeven rate is that because it is the difference between two different bonds, differences in those bonds can distort the measured expected infl ation rate, be they tax differences or changes in liquidity. Indeed, in the fi nancial crisis, a shift to the safest assets (fl ight to quality) created a strong demand for the more liquid nominal treasury bonds, driving their yield down and making the breakeven rate unnaturally low.
There are ways around these problems, but they lack the simplicity of the breakeven rate. For example, one measure of expected infl ation can come from a derivative known as an infl ation swap, which avoids the problem of two different bonds, but it still does not correct for the infl ation risk premium. That correction requires making more assumptions about what form the risk takes and how much people dislike the risk. In other words, it takes an economic model. One approach taken at the Cleveland Fed to such modeling combines data on interest rates from nominal treasury securities, infl ation swaps, and survey measures of infl ation. (See the Recommended Readings for other Commentaries about the approach.)
As might be imagined, this approach is fairly complicated to implement, but in contrast to Avril Lavigne's 2007 lament, there are some benefi ts from being "complicated." The fi rst The next big contributor to rates is infl ation. This refl ects the difference between real and nominal interest rates. With ordinary Treasury bonds, people lend money to the U.S. government, but when they get their money back (with interest), each dollar they receive is worth less because of infl ation. Thus, adjusting for infl ation, the real rate of interest they receive is less than the nominal, or dollar, rate of interest.
This means that the nominal interest rate can be separated into the real rate plus the expected infl ation rate. In other words, if investors hope to get a real return of 3 percent on what they lend, and they expect infl ation to be 2 percent, they charge 5 percent interest. That's why times of high interest rates often correspond to times of high infl ation.
The separability of the nominal rate into the real rate and expected infl ation also suggests a quick way to gauge market expectations of infl ation: look at the difference between nominal and real treasury bonds. The U.S. government issues both kinds, so looking at the difference between the interest rate on nominal treasury bonds and TIPS (Treasury Infl ation Protected Securities), which are protected against infl ation and thus offer a real rate of return, provides an estimate of expected infl ation, at least among the bond-buying public. This difference in rates is often called the breakeven infl ation rate, because at that rate you would break even between holding TIPS or holding nominal bonds. Higher infl ation would make TIPS a better deal, and lower infl ation would mean nominal bonds had the higher payoff.
There's a problem with this approach to uncovering infl ation expectations, however. Future infl ation is uncertain, and people don't like the risk associated with being wrong about it. If investors buy a nominal bond, they bear infl ation risk-with TIPS, being protected against infl ation, they don't. To compensate for this risk, nominal bonds have an extra component besides the real rate and expected infl ais that, by using a model, you get a better, purer measure of infl ation expectations, along with a measure of the infl ation risk premium. Secondly, drawing information from multiple sources captures aspects of the problem single sources would miss. And fi nally, using a model enforces and exploits a form of consistency: the infl ation that consumers observe ought to be similar to what investors observe, and traders should arbitrage away any big differences between the infl ation expectations built into nominal Treasury debt and other instruments, such as infl ation swaps.
Eight Miles High and Falling Fast
The Cleveland model of infl ation expectations gives estimates for a number of interest rate components: expected infl ation, the real interest rate, the infl ation risk premium, and the term premium on real rates (explained below). A look at these components over the past fi ve years does provide some insight into why interest rates are so low right now (fi gure 1).
One reason for lower interest rates is that expected infl ation has fallen. Since the middle of 2010, infl ation expectations have moved downward, by about half a percentage point. In fact, as late as May of 2011, expectations of infl ation over the next ten years were over 2 percent. Now, by having dropped a bit in the past few months, they are a bit below 1.5 percent.
The low expected infl ation provides a perspective on the impact of recent monetary policy. A common concern about the various quantitative easing programs of the Federal Reserve (offi cially termed LSAP, for Large-Scale Asset Purchases, and MEP, Maturity Extension Program, but better known as QE1, 2, and 3, and Operation Twist) is that expanding the Fed's balance sheet will increase the money supply, leading to excessive infl ation. The fi nancial market apparently does not share this concern: expectations not only have fallen, but remain at low absolute rates.
A second reason interest rates are low is that the real interest rate has seen even larger decreases than expected infl ation. In fact, a lower real rate accounts for the bulk of the decrease in nominal interest rates (according to the Cleveland Fed model). As fi gure 2 shows, in March of 2011 the real rate was at 1 percent, and having gone negative for a while is now barely above zero. Note that this estimate is what the model predicts real rates should be, so it does not match up exactly with the real rates seen in the TIPS market, where rates are solidly negative. Put another way, investors are looking at bonds that will pay $1,000 (protected for infl ation) in ten years and paying more than $1,000 dollars for them.
Figure 1 also shows that the risk premium for infl ation has remained fairly steady over the past fi ve years, and, if anything, is currently on the low side of its range. A quick troll through the blogosphere will uncover people obsessed with defl ation and others expecting a return to the hyperinfl ation of the Weimar Republic. Such uncertainty should manifest itself in a high risk premium if it is shared by investors. Clearly, it is not. The low premium also means that we can't attribute the decline in interest rates to people becoming less worried about infl ation extremes.
The infl ation risk premium, though fairly steady, is large enough to make a difference, however. Ignoring it means the breakeven rate overstates expected infl ation by about onehalf of one percent. Back in the early 1980s that wouldn't have made much of a difference, but now, with the Federal Open Market Committee setting an infl ation objective of 2 percent, half a percent makes a difference!
Bills, Bills, Bills
Another way of breaking up interest rates into components is to make use of the relationship between interest rates on short-and long-term bonds. There should be a connection, because investors have the choice of buying a two-year bond, or buying a one-year bond and rolling that over into another one-year bond. Arbitrage should keep those interest rates close. Economists call this the expectations hypothesis, that long rates should be the average of expected future short rates. Of course, it doesn't always work out this way, and the difference is called the term premium, which again arises because of risk and uncertainty-we don't know for sure what rates will be in the future.
This line of thinking tells us that current interest rates could be low because future short-term rates are expected to be low or because the term premium is low. The tricky part is Material may be reprinted if the source is credited. Please send copies of reprinted material to the editor at the address above.
that we don't directly observe expectations of short-term rates-so once again we need a model to extract the term premium. The Cleveland model separately produces two parts of the term-risk premium, one due to infl ation uncertainty and one due to real rate uncertainty, which can then be combined (that is, added together) for the overall term premium. Figure 3 shows the two components of the term premium (repeated from fi gure 1) and their sum, the total term premium. Though the total varies a bit, there is not a dramatic falling off since 2008. So again, it looks like the dominant changes in interest rates will be expectations of nominal rates (themselves combining real rates and infl ation) rather than in the term premium. 
Blowin' in the Wind

